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PLUTARCH ΠΕΡΙ ΕΥΘΥΜΙΑΣ.

BY HAROLD N. FOWLER.

THIS treatise is in the form of a letter from Plutarch to Paccius, who had asked for an explanation of certain points in Plato's *Timaeus*, and also for "something about tranquillity of mind." Plutarch excuses himself, on the score of lack of time, from discussing the *Timaeus*, and says that what he offers on the subject of tranquillity is merely put together from the notes and quotations he happened to have at hand (*ἀνελεξάμην περὶ εὐθυμίας ἐκ τῶν ὑπομνημάτων ὧν ἐμαντῶ πεποιημένος ἐτύγχανον*). In other words, this treatise is professedly made up of extracts from Plutarch's philosophical notebook.

After a rather long introduction (§ 1), Plutarch attacks the Epicurean doctrine that he who wishes to attain tranquillity should withdraw himself from the world, and busy himself as little as possible with public and private affairs. This doctrine, he says, is like the advice given to the sick man, —

μέν, ὦ ταλαίπωρ, ἀτρέμα σοῖς ἐν δεμνίοις,¹

and to prove its worthlessness he brings forward the lack of tranquillity in women in spite of their domestic and retired life, and cites also the examples of Laertes and Achilles to show that retirement

¹ Eur. Or. 258. One is frequently tempted to use the quotations with which the philosophical works of Plutarch and his contemporaries are garnished as convenient signs by the recurrence of which one may be guided in the search for the sources of philosophical doctrines. That such merely accidental signs must be used with caution is a matter of course, but this particular line is well adapted to serve as a warning. Among the writings which go under Plutarch's name, it occurs at least five times (here, *Anim. an Corp. Aff. sint peior.* III = 501 C, an *Seni sit ger. Res P.* IX = 788 F, de *Plac. Phil.* IV, 12 = 901 A, adv. *Colot.* XXXII = 1126 A), and each time in very different surroundings, so that it is absurd to suppose that it is quoted from any previous philosopher, but it must be derived either directly from Euripides, or (which is far more probable) from a *florilegium* or book of quotations.

does not bring tranquillity. Substantially the same doctrines which Plutarch here advocates are advanced by Seneca de Tranq. An. I, who cites Zeno, Cleanthes, and Chrysippus (*i.e.* the Stoics in general) as authorities. Very similar, too, is the doctrine attributed to Athenodorus by Seneca de Tranq. An. III.¹ The example of Achilles is also cited by Seneca de Tranq. An. II,² and by Cicero, Tusc. III, viii, who refers to a discussion by Dionysius Heracleotes of the verses —

Corque meum penitus turgescit tristibus iris
Cum decore atque omni me orbatum laude recordor.

As these verses are in no way identical with those quoted by Plutarch (Il. I, 488 sqq. and XVIII, 104), it appears that Achilles was a stock example of lonely discontent. After quoting the verses of the Iliad, Plutarch goes on to say: ὁθεν οὐδὲ Ἐπικούρος θίεται δεῖν ἡσυχάζειν, ἀλλὰ τῇ φύσει χρῆσθαι πολιτενομένων καὶ πράσσοντας τὰ κοινὰ τοὺς φιλοτίμους καὶ φιλοδόξους, ὡς μᾶλλον ὑπ' ἀπραγμοσύνης ταραττεσθαι καὶ κακοῦσθαι πεφυκότας, ἢ ὧν ὀρέγονται μὴ τυγχάνωσιν. ἀλλ' ἐκείνος μὲν ἄσποπος, οὐ τοὺς δυναμένους τὰ κοινὰ πράσσειν προτρεπόμενος, ἀλλὰ τοὺς ἡσυχίαν ἀγειν μὴ δυναμένους. This agrees with Seneca ad Serenum de Otio III, 2: duae maxime et in hac re dissident sectae Epicureorum et Stoicorum, sed utraque ad otium diuersa uia mittit. Epicurus ait: "non accedet ad rem publicam sapiens nisi si quid interuenerit." Zenon ait: "accedet ad rem publicam nisi si quid impediuerit."³ The words ὁθεν οὐδὲ Ἐπικούρος οἴεται show plainly enough that the attack upon the doctrine of absolute rest is not derived from an Epicurean source (as indeed it hardly could be), but there is no direct indication of the source from which it is

¹ The doctrine of rest is attributed by Seneca de Tranq. An. XIII, to Democritus: hoc secutum puto Democritum ita coepisse "qui tranquille uolet vivere, nec privatim agat multa nec publice," ad supervacanea scilicet referentem. Cf. Laert. Diog. IX, c. vii, 12, § 45. Epicurus took this doctrine, like so many others, from Democritus. In opposing this doctrine, Seneca de Ben. IV, 13, is evidently opposing the Epicureans.

² R. Hirzel, *Hermes* XIV, p. 356, refers this passage in Seneca to Democritus περὶ εὐθυμίας, and compares Plato Phileb. p. 46, where Democritus is evidently referred to. See also Hirzel, *Unters. zu Cic. Phil. Schriften*, I, p. 145.

³ See Usener, *Epicurea*, p. 95. Cf. Sen. de Tranq. An. XIII: ubi uero nulum officium sollemne nos citat, inhibendae actiones, which is to be referred to Democritus.

derived. The last part, at least, of this chapter (II) seems to be carelessly copied from some previous writer. The chapter ends with the words : τῶν γὰρ καλῶν ἢ παράλειψις οὐχ ἦττον ἢ τῶν φαύλων ἢ πράξις ἀνιάρων ἐστι καὶ ταραχώδες, ὥς εἴρηται ; but this has not been stated anywhere by Plutarch, so that it is evident that the words ὥς εἴρηται, with what immediately precedes, must have been copied without due regard to the connection in which they now come to stand.

The latter part of Chapter III is in substance the same as part of de Virt. et Vit. IV.

de Tranq.

εἴτα τῆς νόσου διαλυθείσης καὶ κράσεως ἑτέρας γενομένης, ἦλθεν ἡ ὑγεία φίλα πάντα ποιούσα καὶ προσηγή. ὁ γὰρ χθές ὡὰ καὶ ἀμύλια καὶ σητάνειον ἄρτον διαπτύνων, τήμερον αὐτόπυρον ἐπ' ἐλαίαις ἡ καρδαμίδι σιτεῖται προσφιλῶς καὶ προθυμῶς. IV. τοιαύτην ὁ λογισμὸς εὐκολίαν καὶ μεταβολὴν ἐγγεγόμενος μεταποιεῖ πρὸς ἕκαστον βίον.

de Virt. et Vit.

Οὐχ ὁρᾷς τοὺς νοσοῦντας, ὅτι τῶν βρωμάτων τὰ καθαριώτατα καὶ πολυτελέστερα δυσχεραίνουσι καὶ διαπτύουσι καὶ παραιτοῦνται προσφερόντων καὶ βιαζομένων· εἴτα τῆς κράσεως μεταβαλούσης, καὶ πνεύματος χρηστοῦ καὶ γλυκεὸς αἵματος ἐγγεγομένου καὶ θερμότητος οἰκείας, ἀναστάντες ἄρτον λιτὸν ἐπὶ τυρῷ καὶ καρδάμῳ χαίρουσι καὶ ἀσμενίζουσιν ἔσθοντες ; τοιαύτην ὁ λόγος ἐμποιεῖ τῇ ψυχῇ διάθεσιν· καὶ αὐτάρκης ἔσθ, ἐὰν μάθῃς τί τὸ καλὸν καὶ ἀγαθὸν ἐστι.

There can be no doubt that these passages are derived from the same original, though it may be that they passed through some other hand before they were adopted by Plutarch. Perhaps they are to be ascribed to Chrysippus, whose habit of comparing the diseases of the mind with those of the body is well known. Galen. de Plac. Hipp. et Plat. V, 439 sq. quotes Chrysippus ἐν τῷ περὶ παθῶν ἡθικῷ· “ Διὸ κατὰ τρόπον προῆκται Ζήνωνι λόγος· ἡ δὲ τῆς ψυχῆς νόσος ὁμοιοτάτῃ ἐστὶ τῇ τοῦ σώματος ἀκαταστασίᾳ. λέγεται δὲ εἶναι σώματος νόσος ἡ ἀσυμμετρία τῶν ἐν αὐτῷ θερμοῦ καὶ ψυχροῦ, ξηροῦ καὶ ὑγροῦ,” and again “ ἡ δὲ ἐν τῷ σώματι ὑγεία εὐκрасία τις καὶ συμμετρία τῶν δ' εἰρημένων.”

Chapter IV begins with a series of contrasts : Alexander's discon-

tent and Crates' happiness, Agamemnon's heaviness of spirit and Diogenes' jokes, Socrates happy in his prison and Phaethon in tears at being refused permission to drive the chariot of the sun. The treatise *περὶ φυγῆς* ends (607 F) with a similar set of contrasts : 'Αναξαγόρας μὲν ἐν τῷ δεσμωτηρίῳ τὸν τοῦ κύκλου τετραγωνισμὸν ἔγραφε. Σωκράτης δὲ φάρμακον πίνων ἐφιλοσόφει, καὶ παρεκάλει φιλοσοφεῖν τοὺς συνήθεις, εὐδαιμονιζόμενος ὑπ' αὐτῶν. τὸν δὲ Φαέθοντα καὶ τὸν Τάνταλον εἰς τὸν οὐρανὸν ἀναβάντας οἱ ποιηταὶ λέγουσι ταῖς μεγίσταις συμφοραῖς περιπεσεῖν διὰ τὴν ἀφροσύνην. It is possible that the collocation of Socrates and Phaethon in these two passages is purely fortuitous, but it seems more probable that both passages are derived from the same source, where a large number of examples was put together, from which Plutarch and his contemporaries could take and leave what they pleased. This source may have been a mere collection of anecdotes arranged under ethical heads, or it may have been a philosophical treatise with copious illustrative stories.

The next part of this chapter opposes the doctrine that habit makes the best life agreeable : ὥσπερ οὖν τὸ ὑπόδημα τῷ ποδὶ συνδιατρέφεται, καὶ οὐ τοῖναντίον, οὕτω τοὺς βίους αἱ διαθέσεις συνεξομοιοῦσιν αὐταῖς. οὐ γὰρ ἡ συνήθεια ποιεῖ τοῖς ἐλομένοις τὸν ἄριστον βίον ἤδὺν, ὥς τις εἶπεν, ἀλλὰ τὸ φρονεῖν ἅμα τὸν αὐτὸν βίον ποιεῖ καὶ ἄριστον καὶ ἡδιστον. Hirzel (Hermes XIV, p. 366, f) thinks that ὥς τις εἶπεν refers to Democritus, and compares fr. 84 ed. Mullach πόνος ξυνεχῆς ἐλαφρότερος ἔωντοῦ τῇ ξυνηθείᾳ γίνεται and Sen. de Tranq. X, 1, 2, 4.¹

If Chapter II (see above) refers directly to Democritus, it is probable that this passage does also. Then the words ἀλλὰ τὸ φρονεῖν . . . ἡδιστον might be taken from some opponent of Democritus (Hirzel thinks Panaetius), but they agree remarkably well with Democr. fr. 5 (Democrat. Orell. n. 6), οὔτε σώμασι οὔτε χρήμασι εὐδαιμονέουσι ἄνθρωποι, ἀλλ' ὀρθοσύνη καὶ πολυφροσύνη. Perhaps this entire passage is to be referred ultimately to Democritus, in which case ὥς τις εἶπεν may be merely a general expression for any one who dissents. The doctrine that habit is of great importance in calming

¹ 1. necessitas fortiter ferre docet, consuetudo facile. 2. nullo meliore nomine de nobis natura meruit, quam quod cum sciret quibus aerumnis nasceremur, calamitatum mollimentum consuetudinem inuenit, cito in familiaritatem grauis-sima adducens. 4. adsuescendum est itaque conditioni suae et quam minimum de illa querendum,

sorrow was accepted by Chrysippus, as quoted by Galen. de Plac. Hipp. et Plat. IV, 419. The fourth chapter ends with Eur. fr. 289 Nauck : —

τοῖς πράγμασιν γὰρ οὐχὶ θνυμοῦσθαι χρεών·
μέλει γὰρ αὐτοῖς οὐδὲν, ἀλλ' ὁ τυγχάνων
τὰ πράγματ' ὀρθῶς ἂν τιθῇ, πράξει καλῶς.

After this, Chapter V begins with Plato's comparison of life to a game at dice, in which we are not responsible for the throw, but only for the use we make of it, and leads up by three further comparisons to the opening words of Chapter VI : *τοῦτο οὖν δεῖ πρῶτον ἀσκεῖν καὶ μελετᾶν, ὥσπερ ὁ τῆς κυνὸς ἀμαρτῶν τῷ λίθῳ, καὶ τὴν μητρυνὴν πατάξας*. Οὐδ' οὕτως, ἔφη, κακῶς. This state of contentment, undisturbed by unexpected reverses, is further exemplified by Diogenes' acceptance of his exile, and Zeno's quiet acquiescence in the loss of his last ship. This last story occurs also in Sen. de Tranq. XIV, 3, as the story of Anaxagoras in Chapter XVI occurs in Seneca XI, whence Hirzel concludes that Seneca and Plutarch both took it from Panaetius ; but the same story is found de Cap. ex Inim. Util. II, de Exil. XI, Sen. de Tranq. XIV, Laert. Diog. VII, 5, Anton. et Max. p. 820.

That it is in all these instances taken directly from Panaetius *περὶ εὐθυμίας* appears highly improbable, and leaves room for some doubt regarding the source from which Plutarch and Seneca derived it in their treatises on tranquillity of mind. It is, however, reasonable to suppose that both Plutarch and Seneca had read Panaetius, and they may perhaps have taken this anecdote from him without the intervention of a florilegium. The advice given by Plutarch in the same chapter, that we comfort ourselves by considering the misfortunes of the great (*διὸ καὶ τοῦτο πρὸς εὐθυμίαν μέγα, τὸ τοὺς ἐνδόξους ἀποθωρεῖν εἰ μὴδὲν ὑπὸ τῶν αὐτῶν πεπόνθασι*) is given and elaborated in somewhat different forms by Seneca ad Polyb. de Consol. XIV sqq., and ad Marciam de Consol. XII sq. It is to be remarked that the treatise *περὶ εὐθυμίας* has a strong general resemblance to the "Consolationes," even when particular passages do not exactly correspond.

Chapter VII may be passed over with the remark that its prevailing character is Stoic. The line of Sophocles, —

πικρὰν χολὴν κλύζουσι φαρμάκω πικρῷ,

occurs also de Facie in Orbe Lunae VII.

Chapter VIII begins: *ὁθεν ἐκείνον αἰθις τὸν περὶ τῶν πραγμάτων λόγον ἀναλάβωμεν*. These words refer apparently to the end of Chapter IV, so that the intervening chapters may be regarded as an addition inserted after Chapter IV and its continuation in Chapter VIII had been written. Yet this is not a connected episode, but rather a number of loosely joined anecdotes and remarks. The first part of Chapter VIII is the development of the idea advanced in Chapter IV, from which, by a natural transition, Plutarch goes on to recommend that we pay attention to those points in which we are fortunate rather than to those in which we are the reverse.¹

Chapter X begins: *καίτοι καὶ τοῦτο μέγα πρὸς εὐθυμίαν ἐστὶ, τὸ μάλιστα μὲν αὐτὸν ἐπισκοπεῖν καὶ τὰ καθ' ἑαυτὸν, εἰ δὲ μὴ, τοὺς ὑποδεστέρους ἀποθεωρεῖν, καὶ μὴ, καθάπερ οἱ πολλοὶ πρὸς τοὺς ὑπερέχοντας ἀντιπαρεξάγουσιν*, with which Democritus, frg. 20 (Stob. Flor. I, 40), may be compared: *ἐπὶ τοῖσι δυνατοῖσι ὧν δέει ἔχειν τὴν γνώμην καὶ τοῖσι παρεοῦσι ἀρκέεσθαι, τῶν μὲν ζηλουμένων καὶ θωυμαζομένων ὀλίγην μνήμην ἔχοντα καὶ τῇ διανοίᾳ μὴ προσεδρεύνοντα, τῶν δὲ ταλαιπωρεόντων τοὺς βίους θεωρεῖν, ἐννοεῦμενον τὰ πάσχουσι κάρτα, ὅκως ἂν τὰ παρόντα σοι καὶ ὑπάρχοντα μεγάλα καὶ ζηλωτὰ φαίνονται καὶ μηκέτι πλείονων ἐπιθυμούντι ξυμβαίνει κακοπαθεῖν τῇ ψυχῇ. . . . διόπερ τὰ μὲν μὴ διζήσθαι χρεών, ἐπὶ τοῖσι δὲ εὐθυμείσθαι χρεών, παραβάλλοντα τὸν ἑωυτοῦ βίον πρὸς τὸν τῶν φανλότερον πρησσόντων, καὶ μακαρίζειν ἑωυτόν, ἐνθυμούμενον τὰ πάσχουσι, ὅκως αὐτέων βέλτιον πρήσση τε καὶ διάγῃ*. That Plutarch is here making use of Democritus cannot be doubted, but there is so little verbal agreement between the above passages, that the conclusion is forced upon us that, although Democritus is the ultimate source of Plutarch's doctrine, the words are derived from some other writer.

The verses of Archilochus, —

οὐ μοι τὰ Γύγῳ τοῦ πολυχρύσου μέλει, κτλ.,

furnish another proof that Plutarch copied his quotations not directly from the works of the poets, but from anthologies; for after quoting the verses he proceeds: *Θάσιος γὰρ ἦν ἐκεῖνος*, that is, of course, Archilochus, who emigrated from his native Paros to Thasos. But Aristotle (Rhet. III, 17, p. 1418 b) says: *ποιεῖ γὰρ* (sc. Archilochus)

¹ The verses in Chapter VIII occur also de Curiositate I.

λέγοντα Χάρωνα τὸν τέκτονα ἐν ἰάμβῳ, οὗ ἡ ἀρχή· οὗ μοι τὰ Γύγεια, so that the ἐκεῖνος of Plutarch ought to refer to Charon, not to Archilochus. If Plutarch had known this (*i.e.* if he had read the whole poem, and not merely the familiar quotation), he must have expressed himself differently.

The next illustration is very like Sen. de Tranq. IV, 5. Plutarch says: ἄλλος δέ τις Χίος, ἄλλος δὲ Γαλάτης ἢ Βιθυνὸς, οὐκ ἀγαπῶν, εἴ τινος μερίδος ἢ δόξαν ἢ δύναμιν ἐν τοῖς ἑαυτοῦ πολίταις εἴληχεν, ἀλλὰ κλαίων, ὅτι μὴ φορεῖ πατρικίους· ἐὰν δὲ καὶ φορῇ, ὅτι μηδέπω στρατηγεῖ Ῥωμαίων· ἐὰν δὲ καὶ στρατηγῇ, ὅτι μὴ ὑπατεύει· καὶ ὑπατεύων, ὅτι μὴ πρῶτος ἀλλ' ὑστερος ἀνγορεύθῃ. Seneca: non uis enim nisi consul aut prytanis aut ceryx aut sufes administrare rem publicam. quid si militare nolis nisi imperator aut tribunus? and in a different connection the same illustration is found in Sen. de Ben. II, 27, 4: aequae ambitio non patitur quemquam in ea mensura honorum conquiescere quae quondam eius fuit impudens uotum: nemo agit de tribunatu gratias, sed queritur, quod non est ad praeturam usque perductus. nec haec grata est, si deest consulatus. ne hic quidem satiat, si unus est. It is not very probable that these three passages are derived immediately from the same source. Seneca de Beneficiis is, for the most part, taken from Hecato;¹ Hirzel has shown² that Seneca de Tranquillitate imitates Democritus; Plutarch follows various authorities. The illustration in question is a very natural one, and was doubtless employed by some early writer. Perhaps Democritus was the first to use it, and Seneca de Tranq. gives it in a less Roman and more Greek form than that of the other two passages where it occurs; but it does not follow from this that Hecato or Seneca or Plutarch took it from Democritus, but only that it had become familiar, and was found in various places and connections.

The story told of Socrates near the end of Chapter X is told by Teles (Peerlkamp, Musonius, p. 185; Stob. Flor. V, 67) in nearly the same form of Diogenes. It is easy for such anecdotes to be shifted from one person to another.

Plutarch's advice in Chapter XI, that one should not be dazzled by the outward happiness of others, ἀλλ' ἀνακαλύψας καὶ διαστείλας ὥσπερ

¹ Transactions of the American Philological Association, 1886, p. 24 ff.

² Hermes XIV, p. 354 ff.

ἀνθρὸν παραπέτασμα τὰς δόξας αὐτῶν καὶ τὴν ἐπιφάνειαν, ἐντὸς γενοῦ, καὶ κατόψει πολλὰ δυσχερῇ καὶ πολλὰς ἀηδίας ἐνοίσας αὐτοῖς, has been compared by Hirzel with Democr. frg. 18, εἶδωλα ἐσθῆτι (with Meineke for αἰσθητικά) καὶ κόσμῳ διαπρεπεία πρὸς θεωρίην, ἀλλὰ καρδίας κενεά. The first poetic illustration recurs de Virt. et Vit. II.

The first part of Chapter XII (οὐχ ἥκιστα τοῖνυν εὐθυμίαν κολουεῖ τὸ μὴ συμμέτροις χρῆσθαι, πρὸς τὴν ὑποκειμένην δύναμιν ὁρμαῖς, ὥσπερ ἰστίοις, ἀλλὰ μειζόνων ἐφιεμένους ταῖς ἐλπίσιν, εἴτ' ἀποτυγχάνοντας, αἰτιᾶσθαι δαίμονα καὶ τύχην, ἀλλὰ μὴ τὴν αὐτῶν ἀβελτηρίαν) is compared by Hirzel with Sen. de Tranq. X, 5 (non sunt praeterea cupiditates in longinquum mittendae, sed in uicinum illis egredi permittamus, quoniam includi ex toto non patiuntur, relictis his, quae aut non possunt fieri aut difficulter possunt, prope posita speique nostrae adludentia sequamur), and Democr. frg. 79 (ἐλπίδες αἱ τῶν ὀρθὰ φρονούντων ἐφικταί, αἱ δὲ τῶν ἀξυνέτων ἀδύνατοι). The same idea is repeated by Seneca ib. XII, 1: proximum ab his erit, ne aut in superuacuis aut ex superuacuo laboremus, id est, *ne quae aut non possumus consequi concupiscamus*, aut adepti uanitatem cupiditatum nostrarum sero post multum pudorem intellegamus. Hirzel also observes that the first part of this chapter has points of resemblance to Sen. de Tranq. VI and Democr. frg. 147 and 14. The reference to the Stoic paradox that the wise man is not only good and noble, but also a general, a poet, a king, etc., is evidently derived from a Stoic source.

The saying of Aristotle about Alexander, οὐκ Ἀλεξάνδρῳ μόνον προσήκει μέγα φρονεῖν, ὅτι κρατεῖ πολλῶν ἀνθρώπων, ἀλλ' οὐχ ἡττον οἷς ὑπάρχει περὶ θεῶν αἰεὶ δοξάζειν, in Chapter XIII, occurs de Profect. in Virt. VI and de Seips. citr. Inv. Laud. XVI, both times in connection with Agesilaus' query in respect to the Persian king, τί ἐμοῦ μείζον ἐκείνος εἰ μὴ καὶ δικαιοτέρος; so that these two passages may probably be derived from the same source, but that the passage in περὶ εὐθυμίας has any real connection with them does not appear.¹

The beginning of Chapter XIV, ὅτι δὲ ἕκαστος ἐν ἑαυτῷ τὰ τῆς εὐθυμίας καὶ τῆς δυσθυμίας ἔχει ταμεῖα, is compared by Hirzel with Democr. frg. 96 (Plut. vol. VII, p. 950, ed. Reiske, p. 500, ed. Xyl.),

¹ The first, third, and fourth lines of the quotation from Pindar are found also de Virt. Mor. XII.

ἀν δὲ σαντὸν ἔνδοθεν ἀνοίξης, ποικίλον τι καὶ πολυπαθὲς κακῶν ταμείον εὐρήσεις καὶ θησαύρισμα, though the likeness is not so striking as to lead one to assign this passage to Democritus, except for the likeness of the teaching of this chapter to that in the first part of Chapter XII, where a comparison with Democritus was easy. The doctrine that every man is the steward of his own happiness is sufficiently common to make a reference to any particular source unnecessary and rather forced, but the use of the word *ταμεία* lends countenance to Hirzel's assumption that Democritus is the original of at least the beginning of this chapter. The figure of the two casks ἐν Διὶ οὔδει (Il. Ω 527) is carried out in detail de Exil. IV (cf. de Aud. Poet. VI).

The figure of the ass eating the straw rope may have been, — like the cask of the Danaides, — a common one to express thankless and fruitless toil, but it is at any rate a very natural figure for Plutarch to employ, as he must have been familiar with the famous picture by Polygnotus at Delphi (Paus. X, 29). This chapter agrees with what Cicero, Tusc. III, 15, 32, gives as the doctrine of Epicurus: *leuationem autem aegritudinis in duabus rebus ponit, auocatione a cogitanda molestia et reuocatione ad contemplandas uoluptatis: parere enim censet animum rationi posse et quo illa ducat sequi. uetat igitur ratio intueri molestias, abstrahit ab acerbis cogitationibus, hebetem facit aciem ad miserias contemplandas, a quibus cum cecinit receptui impellit rursum et incitat ad conspiciendas totaque mente contrectandas uarias uoluptatis, quibus ille et praeteritorum memoria et spe consequentium sapientis uitam refertam putat.* The first part of Chapter XV cannot be separated from what precedes.

In Chapter XVI ὁ τῆς αὔριον ἡκιστα δεόμενος ἡδίστα πρόσσεισι πρὸς τὴν αὔριον is quoted from Epicurus,¹ and the recommendation to moderation which follows is in agreement with his doctrines. The rest of the chapter is taken up with the Cyrenaic² doctrine that unexpected evils are more painful. The calmness of Anaxagoras upon the announcement of his child's death is a favorite anecdote.³

¹ For similar passages, see Usener, Epicurea, p. 307.

² Cic. Tusc. III, 22: *Cyrenaicorum restat sententia: qui aegritudinem censent existere si necopinato quid euenit. est id quidem magnum, ut supra (14) dixi.*

³ It is told or referred to: de Cohib. Ira XVI, 463 D; de Cons. ad Apoll. XXXIII; Sen. de Tranq. XI; ad Polyb. de Cons. XI; Cic. Tusc. III, 14. Cicero

In opposition to the Epicurean doctrine that one should not think of unpleasant possibilities,¹ Plutarch advises to prepare the mind for every chance, a Stoic doctrine which is also taught in Chapter XIX, Cic. Tusc. III, 14; Sen. de Tranq. XI; ad Marc. de Consol. IX; Pseudo Plut. Cons. ad Apoll. XXI; Posidonius ap. Galen. de Plac. Hipp. et Plat. IV, 417.

Chapter XVII begins with the doctrine that our troubles are a matter of opinion. This is an Epicurean doctrine,² but was also accepted by Stoic philosophers.³ It is summed up from a negative point of view in the verse of Menander (quoted also de Exil. I) :—

οὐδὲν πέπονθας δεινὸν ἂν μὴ προσποιῇ.

The passage *ὅθεν οὐ δεῖ . . . οὐδὲ παρελίσθαι τὴν διάθεσιν* is quoted by Stob. Ecl. Eth. p. 199, as a fragment of Plutarch's lost treatise, *περὶ φιλίας*.

The first part of Chapter XVIII is Epicurean. The passage *τὸν*

seems to have taken the story from Posidonius, to whom it is ascribed by Galen. de Plac. Hipp. et Plat. IV, 7, p. 418. Posidonius is here contending against the definition of grief given by Chrysippus: *λύπη ἐστὶ δόξα πρόσφατος κακοῦ παρουσίας* (p. 416). After some other arguments the extract goes on (p. 417): *καὶ φησι* (sc. Posidonius), *διότι πᾶν τὸ ἀμέτρητον καὶ ξένον ἀθρόως προσπίπτον ἐκπλήττει τε καὶ τῶν παλαιῶν ἐξίστησι κρίσεων, ἀσκηθὲν δὲ καὶ συνεθισθὲν καὶ χρονίαν ἢ οὐδὲ βλῶς ἐξίστησι, ὡς κατὰ πάθος κινεῖν, ἢ ἐπὶ μικρὸν κομιδῇ, διὸ καὶ προενδημεῖν δεῖν φησι τοῖς πράγμασι μήπω τε παρούσιν οἶον παροῦσι χρῆσθαι. βούλεται δὲ τὸ προενδημεῖν ῥῆμα τῷ ἸΠοσειδωνίῳ τὸ οἶον προαναπλάττειν τε καὶ προτυποῦν τὸ πρᾶγμα παρὰ ἑαυτῷ τὸ μέλλον γενήσεσθαι καὶ ὡς πρὸς ἤδη γενόμενον ἐθισμὸν τινα ποιεῖσθαι κατὰ βραχύ. διὸ καὶ τὸ τοῦ Ἀναξαγόρου προείληφεν ἐνταῦθα, ὡς ἔρα τινος ἀναγγέλλαντος αὐτῷ τεθνάναι τὸν υἱόν, εἰ μάλᾳ καθεστηκότως εἶπεν, ἥδειν θνητὸν γεννήσας, καὶ ὡς τοῦτο λαβὼν Εὐριπίδης τὸ νόημα τὸν Θήσέα πεποίηκε λέγοντα: Eurip. frg. 392 Nauck, and frg. 818. ὅτι δὲ ἐν τῷ χρόνῳ μαλαττεται τὰ πάθη κἂν αἱ δόξαι μένωσι τοῦ κακὸν τι αὐτοῖς γεγονέναι, καὶ ὁ Χρύσιππος ἐν τῇ δευτέρῳ περὶ παθῶν μαρτυρεῖ, κτλ., and p. 420 ὅτι μὲν οὖν ἐν τῷ χρόνῳ παύεται τὰ πάθη καίτοι τῆς δόξης διαμενούσης, αὐτὸς ὁ Χρύσιππος ὁμολογεῖ.*

¹ Cic. Tusc. III, 16: principio male reprehendunt (sc. Epicurei) praemeditationem rerum futurarum.

² Cic. Tusc. III, 13, 28: Epicuro placet opinionem mali aegritudinem esse natura, ut quicumque intueatur in aliquod maius malum, id si sibi accidisse opinetur, sit continuo in aegritudine. Cf. *ibid.* 15, 32.

³ *δόξαν γὰρ εἶναι πρόσφατον τοῦ κακὸν αὐτῷ παρεῖναι φησι τὴν λύπην.* Posidonius as cited above.

μὲν γὰρ ἀνόητον ὁ τοῦ θανάτου φόβος, οὐχ ὁ τοῦ ζῆν πόθος ἐκκρέμασθαι τοῦ σώματος ποιεῖ, περιπεπλεγμένον, ὥσπερ τὸν Ὀδυσσεά, τῷ ἔρινεφ, δεδοκίκα τὴν Χάρυβδιν ὑποκειμένην,

ἐνθ' οὔτε μίμνειν ἄνεμος οὔτε πλεῖν ἑᾶ,

is compared by Hirzel with Democr. frg. 54, ἀνοήμονες τὸ ζῆν ὡς στυγέοντες, ζῆν ἐθέλουσι δέματι ἰδέεω. Epicurus expressed much the same idea in paradoxical form. Seneca Epist. 24, 22, says: obiurgat Epicurus non minus eos qui mortem concupiscunt quam eos qui timent, et ait: "ridiculum est currere ad mortem taedio uitae, cum genere uitae ut currendum ad mortem esset effeceris." item alio loco dicit: "quid tam ridiculum quam adpetere mortem, cum uitam inquietam tibi feceris metu mortis?"¹ The rest of the chapter is Stoic² in character, for it is taken up with an argument against the (Epicurean) doctrine that one should not think of unpleasant things. This part of the chapter is, however, not directed against the first part.

Chapter XX resembles in a general way the last chapter of Sen. de Tranq. Up to this point both Plutarch and Seneca have given precepts for the banishment of care and trouble; now they turn to the recommendation of joy and gayety.

Hirzel, *Hermes* XIV, p. 354 ff., discusses Seneca de Tranq., and shows that a great part of that treatise is derived from Democritus *περὶ εὐθυμίας*. There can be no doubt that this conclusion is correct. Seneca, who appears for the most part as a Stoic, stands throughout this treatise upon Epicurean (or, more strictly, Democritean) ground, and when he cites Stoic authorities (I, 10; III, 1; VII, 2; XIV, 3), uses them merely as illustrations. The points of resemblance between Plutarch's treatise and that of Seneca have been noticed above. Hirzel thinks that Plutarch opposes the doctrines of Democritus. This is certainly the case in Chapter II, if the doctrine of absolute rest is properly ascribed to Democritus. But the passages cited above show that neither Democritus nor Epicurus really advanced any such doctrine. If the polemic against this doctrine is meant to be directed against Democritus, it must have been conceived by some

¹ See Usener, *Epicurea*, p. 309 f.

² See Posidonius, as quoted above.

one who did not understand Democritus ; and that Panaetius was guilty of such carelessness is, even after Hirzel's explanation, hard to believe. It is, however, not true that Plutarch opposes Democritus throughout his treatise. Granting that he does so in Chapter II, he does not in Chapter IV (see above), Chapters X, XI, XII, XIV, XVI,¹ XVII, XVIII, nor XX. These are the only passages in which traces of Democritus *περὶ εὐθυμίας* can be believed to exist.² The rest of the treatise is mainly Stoic in character, but it is not so connected as to seem a systematic revision or reduction of one work by a previous writer. Chapter IV is taken up again in Chapter VIII, and Stoic and Epicurean doctrines alternate *without polemic*. The whole is interspersed with quotations from various poets and anecdotes of philosophers and rulers. That the poetic quotations are taken, not directly from the works of the poets, but from a florilegium or common-place book, is made clear by the recurrence of the same lines in different places, as well as by the somewhat forced manner of their introduction. The same is doubtless true of the anecdotes, though perhaps not to such an extent.³

The best known works on tranquillity were doubtless those of Democritus and Panaetius *περὶ εὐθυμίας*. The first of these furnished the greater part of the matter for Seneca de Tranquillitate. Hirzel thinks the second is followed by Plutarch. But Seneca wrote in Latin, and could, therefore, without discredit, follow Democritus or any other Greek writer. Plutarch wrote in Greek, and must, therefore, borrow with discretion. I do not mean to say by this that Seneca was so entirely dependent upon his Greek original as Cicero frequently was, but merely that he did not find it necessary to borrow from a variety of sources in order to hide his own lack of originality. Plutarch could hardly follow Panaetius as Seneca could Democritus, for any one who was interested in *εὐθυμία* and could read Greek,

¹ Unless the doctrine that one should not think of unpleasant possibilities be ascribed to Democritus, in which case Seneca, Chapter XI, opposes him quite as strongly.

² Hirzel does not explicitly ascribe all these passages to Democritus, but seems inclined to consider him responsible for all the non-Stoic parts of Plutarch's treatise.

³ The books called *χρεῖται*, as, for instance, those of Hecato (frg. XX-XXIV, ed. Fowler), were collections of such anecdotes.

would naturally be acquainted with the work of Panaetius. It is natural in the search for the sources of a treatise like this to look first for other treatises on the same subject; but one must be on one's guard against relying too implicitly upon titles. Democritus and Panaetius wrote *περὶ εὐθυμίας*, but Epicurus wrote *περὶ βίων*, and Chrysippus *περὶ παθῶν*, and in both of these works there must have been sections treating of the means by which a calm and happy life may be attained. The same is true of other works known by other titles.¹ We have seen that Plutarch took his quotations and anecdotes from collections of such matters, and collections of philosophical doctrines are well known to have existed.² Stobaeus' florilegium and eclogae consist of selections from various writers, arranged under heads according to their contents. The extent to which this sort of compilation was carried cannot be accurately determined, but it must have been greatly in vogue long before the time of Plutarch. In Plutarch's own writings ethical doctrines recur (e.g. Chapter III) in forms but slightly different from one another, and it is not unreasonable to suppose that he who turned to common-place books for quotations and anecdotes obtained his ethical doctrines from similar sources. Not that Plutarch had not read Plato and other philosophers, but in writing a treatise like that *περὶ εὐθυμίας* he did not need to have recourse to them. He could turn more easily to his book of selections (which he himself may have made or at least added to), where he could find under the headings *εὐθυμία*, *ἀπαραξία*, *λύπη*, and the like, all the material he needed. Then for his introduction and his last chapter he only needed to adapt the corresponding parts of Democritus' *περὶ εὐθυμίας*, and the work was done. That this was his method Plutarch himself seems to say in the opening section of this treatise, and the examination of his work confirms his words. In spite of this the truth remains, that much of the material of Plutarch's treatise belongs in the first instance to Democritus, but that does not show the direct use of Democritus by Plutarch, but only the influence which the first great writer on *εὐθυμία* exerted over all subsequent writers on the same subject.

¹ e.g. Crantor *περὶ πένθους*, Sphaerus *περὶ τῆς ἠθικῆς διατάρξεως* and *περὶ παθῶν*, Cleanthes and Hecato *περὶ ἀρετῶν*, etc.

² Such as those of Aetius and Arius Didymus, treated by Diels, *Doxographi Graeci*.

The results of this examination are mainly negative. Only in a few instances has it been possible to find any indication of the origin of Plutarch's words or doctrines; but something has been accomplished if a little light has been thrown upon the method he pursued.